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Abstract 
This study examines bank competition in the loan markets in India using a new competitiveness index, the Augmented Relative 
Profit Difference (ARPD). The ARPD quantifies the impact of marginal costs on performance, measured in terms of market shares. 
The theoretical foundation of the ARPD is robust when compared to other conventional measures. Applying this unbiased 
competition indicator to loan markets shows that financial reform has contributed to significant improvements in competition. 
Public sector banks and private sector banks are more competitive than foreign banks too. In addition, we find that the Indian loan 
markets are monopolistic in nature. 
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1. Introduction 
It is well known that the financial system in India is predominantly a bank-based system. Banks function as 
depositories for household savings and provide credit services, apart from financing the government through 
investment in Treasury securities. Until the early 1990s, public sector commercial banks performed all of these 
functions in a highly-regulated environment guided by domestic banking for economic development and a fiscal 
policy dominated by macro policy objectives. In such an environment, banks could not market or promote their 
businesses with regard to asset quality and profitability. In the wake of the balance of payment crisis, India 
implemented a series of reform measures designed to alleviate structural impediments to economic growth through a 
competitive and open economic model. At this juncture, it was determined that meaningful economic reform could not 
take place without an overhaul of the financial system. Thus, banking sector reform was pursued based on the 
recommendations of a high-level committee. The reform measures included promoting a diversified, efficient, and 
competitive financial system with the ultimate goal of improving the allocative efficiency of resources through 
operational flexibility, improved financial viability, and institutional strengthening. The banking sector reform 
encompassed five dimensions. First, the level of competition was gradually increased within the banking system by 
allowing greater participation of domestic private and foreign banks while allowing banks greater freedom in pricing 
and allocating credit. Second, measures were taken to develop various segments of the financial markets, such as 
money, bond, credit, foreign exchange, and equity. The concept was to allow banks and financial institutions to offer 
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investors opportunities for diversification, portfolio optimization, and effective management of liquidity and other 
risks. Third, in order to ensure stability of the financial system, banks were subjected to international best practices in 
prudential regulation and supervision tailored to Indian requirements. The supervisory system of the Board for 
Financial Supervision was revamped with the goal to create an efficient banking system. Fourth, measures were taken 
to improve the institutional arrangements of banks including their legal frameworks and technology platforms for 
effective, cost efficient, and sound payment and settlement. Finally, in order to be consistent with the new institutional 
architecture for the financial system in general and the banking sector in particular, the monetary policy shifted from 
direct instruments of monetary management such as cash reserves and statutory liquidity requirements to an increasing 
reliance on indirect instruments such as short-term interest rates including repo and reverse repo rates. Thus, there was 
a shift from the traditional mode of money transfer to an interest rate channel of monetary transmission. Policy 
planners envisioned that in a competitive and integrated financial market environment, banks will be guided by market 
conditions, balance sheet pressures, and regulatory and prudential requirements. In a competitive marketplace, readily 
available credit can have a significant impact on the economy. A banking system that exhibits some degree of market 
power, however, may improve credit availability to certain banks. It may also provide incentives for banks to screen 
loans, which aids efficient allocation of resources. Market power in a banking system may contribute to stability by 
providing incentives that mitigate risk-taking behavior, and by providing incentives to screen and monitor loans, 
which can improve the quality of banks’ portfolios. Policies such as capital requirements, disclosure rules, and risk-
based deposit insurance, however, are incentives for banks to behave prudently even in a competitive market. A new 
approach to measure competition was introduced and applied by Boone (2000, 2004, 2008). The so-called Boone 
indicator (Relative Profit Difference or RPD) measures the impact of efficiency on performance in terms of profits or 
market shares. The idea behind the RPD is that competition enhances the performance of efficient banks and impairs 
the performance of inefficient banks. This approach is related to the well-known efficiency hypothesis, which also 
explains bank performance by differences in efficiency (Goldberg and Rai, 1996; Smirlock, 1985). This method 
allows measurement of competition for the entire banking sector, as well as for separate product markets, such as the 
loan market, and for single types of banks, such as commercial and cooperative banks. In this study, we use the 
augmented RPD (ARPD) measure to evaluate competition in the Indian banking sector. Generally, policymakers 
support a banking system that promotes economic efficiency and stability and they want to evaluate whether a policy 
change had the desired effect. To illustrate, a regulatory body may want to monitor an industry so that it can intervene 
when competition slackens; they implement a policy change with the goal of intensifying competition in a faltering 
industry. Competition in the financial sector is vital for a number of reasons: (1) for the efficient production of 
financial services, (2) the quality of financial products, and (3) the degree of innovation in the sector. The degree of 
competition in a financial sector impacts the availability of financial services and external financing, which affects 
economic growth, although not all relationships are clear. The theory of industrial organization is based on the concept 
that the competitiveness of an industry cannot be measured by market structure indicators alone, such as the number of 
institutions, the Herfindahl index or other concentration indexes (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig, 1982). The threat of 
market entry can be a more important determinant of the behavior of market participants (Besanko and Thakor, 1992). 
Theory also suggests that performance measures, such as the size of a bank’s margins or profitability, do not 
necessarily indicate the competitiveness of a banking system. Performance measures are influenced by a number of 
factors, such as a country's macro performance and stability, the form and degree of taxation, the quality of the 
country's information and judicial systems, and bank-specific factors, such as scale of operations and risk preferences. 
As such, these measures can be poor indicators of the degree of competition.  
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The rest of the paper is presented in five sections. In Section 2, we review the literature. In Section 3, we discuss the 
theoretical perspectives, methodology, and data, followed by a discussion of stylized facts in Section 4. In Section 5, 
we present the empirical analyses. We present concluding remarks is Section 6. 
2. Literature Review 
The evidence of measuring the level of competition in the Indian banking system is scarce. There have been a few 
studies that have investigated the degree of competition in Indian financial industries. Prasad and Ghosh (2005) 
estimated the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic of Indian banks for the 1996 to 2004 period. They found that the 
Indian banking sector was in monopolistic competition equilibrium. Murthy and Deb (2008) used Bodenhorn’s 
Measure of Mobility to measure the competition in Indian private sector banks for the 1992-2002 periods. They found 
that the market structure of the private banking sector in India is monopolistic. Testing for the degree of effective 
competition requires a structural contestability approach, along the lines pursued in much of the industrial organization 
literature. As in other sectors, the degree of competition in the banking system should be measured with respect to the 
actual behavior of the (marginal) bank. The actual behavior should be related not only to banking market structure but 
also to entry barriers, including barriers on foreign ownership, as well as the severity of activity restrictions since those 
can limit intra-industry competition. Furthermore, the degree of competition from other forms of financial 
intermediation (capital markets, nonbank financial institutions, insurance companies) will play a role in determining 
banking system competitiveness. As a first-order effect, one would expect increased competition in the financial sector 
to lead to lower costs and enhanced efficiency, even allowing for the fact that financial products are heterogeneous. 
Recent research has illustrated, however, that the relationships between competition and banking system performance, 
access to financing, stability, and growth are more complex. Market power in banking, for example, may be beneficial 
for access to financing (Petersen and Rajan, 1995). The view that competition is unambiguously good in banking is 
more naïve than in other industries, and vigorous rivalry may not necessarily be beneficial for financial sector 
performance. This literature has also shown that technology that lowers production or distribution costs for financial 
services providers does not necessarily lead to more or better access to finance.  A number of people have investigated 
banking system competition. Berger and Hannan (1989) investigate the commonly observed relationship between 
market concentration and profitability using data for U.S. banks from 1983 to 1985. They try to separate the effects of 
noncompetitive price behavior from that of greater efficiency for firms with larger market share and find that 
noncompetitive price behavior could explain the relationship. While many of the studies are not formal structure-
performance-conduct tests, their results have been interpreted as being indicative of the degree of competition and/or 
its causes and consequences in the financial sector (Berger, 1995). Recent studies have investigated how regulations 
and specific structural or other factors impact bank performance. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) document, among 
others, that tighter entry requirements are negatively linked with bank efficiency, leading to higher interest rate 
margins and overhead expenditures, while restricting foreign bank participation tends to increase bank fragility. These 
results are consistent with the view that tighter entry restrictions tend to limit competition and emphasize that it is not 
the actual level of foreign presence or bank concentration but the contestability of a market that determines bank 
efficiency and stability. A number of people have applied either the Bresnahan (1982) or the Panzar and Rosse (1987) 
methodology to the issue of financial sector competition, although mostly to the banking system specifically. Cetorelli 
(2004) provides more detail on these formal tests and reviews the results of empirical banking studies. One of the first 
applications of the Bresnahan test is that of Shaffer (1989). For a sample of U.S. banks, his findings strongly reject 
collusive conduct but are consistent with perfect competition. Using the same model, Shaffer (1993) finds that the 
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Canadian banking system was competitive over the 1965-1989 period despite being relatively concentrated. Gruben 
and McComb (2003) find that the Mexican banking system before 1995 was more competitive, that is, marginal prices 
were set below marginal costs. Shaffer (2001) uses the Bresnahan (1982) model and examines 15 countries for the 
1979-1991 period in North America, Europe, and Asia. He finds significant market power in five markets and excess 
capacity in one market. Estimates were consistent with either contestability or Cournot type oligopoly in most of these 
countries, while five countries were significantly more competitive than Cournot behavior would imply. Shaffer 
(1982) applied the Panzar and Rosse model to a sample of New York banks using data for 1979 and found 
monopolistic competition. Nathan and Neave (1989) studied Canadian banks using the Panzar and Rosse methodology 
and found results consistent with the results of Shaffer (1989) using the Bresnahan methodology (i.e., a rejection of 
monopoly power). Several studies have applied the Panzar and Rosse methodology to European banking systems. 
Generally, the studies reject both perfect collusion and perfect competition and largely find evidence of monopolistic 
competition (Bikker and Haaf, 2001). Some studies find differences between types of banks. For example, De Bandt 
and Davis (2000) find monopoly behavior for small banks in France and Germany while they find monopolistic 
competition for small banks in Italy and for the large banks in all three countries in their sample. This suggests that in 
these countries small banks have more market power perhaps as they cater more to local markets. The price cost 
margin (PCM) is widely used as a measure of competition. However, the theoretical foundations of PCM as a 
competitive measure are not robust. Theoretical papers like Amir (2002), Bulow and Klemperer (1999), Rosentahl 
(1980), and Stiglitz (1989) present models where more intense competition leads to higher PCMs instead of lower 
margins. Boone (2008) assumes that more efficient firms (i.e., firms with lower marginal costs) will have a greater 
share of the market and higher profits, and that this effect will be stronger in more competitive markets. In order to 
support this intuitive market characteristic, Boone (2000, 2001, and 2008; Boone et al., 2004) develops a broad set of 
theoretical models and finds them to be more robust than any other methods (e.g., PCM, HHI, H-statistic). Both 
competition and market power, however, can have positive implications for efficiency and prudent regulation. It may 
be advisable to facilitate competitive behavior (contestability), thereby minimizing the potential costs of market power 
while realizing whatever benefits may be associated with any residual market power. In contrast, structural variables 
do not have a significant impact on market competition, as measured by the H-statistic. Contestability appears to be 
more important than market structure in explaining the strength of competition in the banking sector. In general, four 
approaches have been used to measure competition in the banking sector: PCM, HHI, H-statistic, and Augmented 
Relative Profit Difference (ARPD). The ARPD method is used in this study to measure competition in the Indian 
banking sector.  
 
2.1. Structural measures of competition  
 
Familiar measures of market structure, such as concentration ratios, the number of banks, and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI), are still widely used in empirical work. These measures originated in the structure-conduct-
performance (SCP) paradigm linking the structure of a market to influences on bank behaviour and thus sector 
performance. One prediction of the SCP approach is that higher concentration would encourage collusion and reduce 
efficiency. However, the SCP paradigm has well-known weaknesses. Structure may not be exogenous; it might be due 
to bank behaviour. A more concentrated market structure could be the result of better, more efficient performance, 
contrary to the predictions of the SCP paradigm. There is no consensus on the most appropriate variable for measuring 
market structure in banking; performance is typically measured with variables, such as net interest margins or 
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profitability, which can be influenced by factors other than the degree of competition, such as a country’s 
macroeconomic situation or the level of taxation.  
 
2.2. Measures of market contestability  
 
The PCM approach can be used to assess competitive conditions in terms of contestability. It is widely used as a 
measure of competition. It is believed that there are two reasons why PCM is still such a popular empirical measure of 
competition. First, as long as there is no evidence that the theoretical counterexamples are important empirically, one 
would expect that PCM remains a popular competition measure. The second reason for the popularity of PCM is that 
the data needed to get a reasonable estimate of PCM are available in most datasets. A concentrated banking sector can 
remain competitive if it is contestable, that is if entry and exit into the system is easy and if bank regulations and 
supervision promote a level playing field. Variables like regulatory indicators of entry requirements, the presence of 
foreign ownership, formal and informal entry barriers, and activity restrictions measure the threat of entry in the sector 
and thus its contestability through the degree of entry and exit. Indeed, the standard approach used in the literature to 
retrieve the PCM specifies a demand function and the derivation of its first-order equilibrium condition, in which it is 
shown that (e.g. ,in the Cournot case) for a given bank ‘i’ the first-order condition (FOC) amounts to Li = αi/ε, where 
αi is the market share of the bank, ε is the elasticity of demand, and Li is the PCM, or Lerner Index, calculated as (P - 
MC)/P, i.e., how far a bank’s price is from its marginal cost. Two different empirical versions of the Lerner Index 
approach are available in the literature, and both can be used at the bank level of analysis, since they only need the 
availability of balance sheet data. The basic one is a simple ratio between the profits and assets of a single bank, as in 
the case of Aghion et al. (2005) and Nickell (1996). However, theoretically, PCM is not a robust measure of 
competition; it has an aggregation problem. When aggregating from a bank-level PCM to an industry-level PCM using 
a weighted average method, where the weight of a bank equals its market share in the industry, there are possibilities 
for a wrong inference of the competitive measure using the PCM approach. An increase in competition reallocates 
market share from inefficient banks to efficient banks. Since efficient banks have a higher PCM than inefficient banks, 
the increase in competition raises the weight in the industry average PCM of banks with a high PCM, which can raise 
the industry average PCM (Wolfram, 1999; Boone, 2004), although this may not be an accurate indication of 
competition. Amir (2003) shows that, under certain conditions, an increase in competition through an increase in the 
number of banks in a market can result in an increasing average PCM. Stiglitz (1989) shows that under certain 
circumstances, profits per unit sales can rise during a recession. Thus, even though competition among banks increases 
during recessions, industry PCM also increases. Another potential source of error can be the reallocation effect. As a 
result of fiercer competition, the market share of the more efficient banks increases while it decreases for less efficient 
banks. Thus, the weighted average PCM can increase if the increase in the market share of the more efficient banks 
over-compensates the decrease of the respective individual PCMs. Therefore, the Lerner Index (i.e., PCM) is, at least 
theoretically, potentially misleading.  
 
2.3. Direct measures of competition 
 
The so-called H-statistic approach measures the intensity of competition directly, in the way prices or outputs respond 
to costs. Many recent studies of banking use the H-statistic based on the Panzar and Rosse (1987) methodology, which 
proxies the reaction of output to input prices. The H-statistic is calculated by summing the estimated elasticities of 
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revenue to factor prices; a value of one indicates perfect competition, a value of zero (or less) indicates monopoly, and 
intermediate values indicate the degree of monopolistic competition. The index ranges from a high of 1 to a low of 0, 
with higher numbers implying greater market power. The theoretical foundation for direct measures is stronger than 
for structural measures, but direct measures have drawbacks too. For example, the H-statistic imposes restrictive 
assumptions on a bank’s cost functions. This measure neglects differences among banks like size, product or 
geographic differentiation. Still, this approach is increasingly used in empirical research because it measures bank 
behaviour and thus competition directly.  
 
2.4. Augmented Relative Profit Difference 
 
Boone (2008) proposed a new competition measure, the Relative Profit Difference (RPD). Despite its theoretical 
robustness, few studies have applied the RPD to real-world data. The only paper published in a refereed technical 
journal, to our knowledge, is Bikker and Leuvensteijn (2008). Using data for the Dutch life insurance market, they 
calculate RPD using different approximations of the variable costs. The RPD measure overcomes the problems of 
heterogeneity, aggregation, and attrition that could have arisen in the previous sections. Moreover, this variable can be 
constructed using the same bank-level data used to calculate the PCM, without any additional data requirements. It 
could be the case that a more efficient bank would report lower costs (then having a higher bank-level PCM), whereas 
less efficient banks would report higher costs (therefore lower bank-level PCM). Given a competitive shock in the 
sector due to more aggressive behaviour by the incumbents (e.g., a lower elasticity of substitution among products), a 
less efficient bank would exit and their market share would be distributed among the other banks, hence eventually 
increasing the aggregate PCM. This is a case where a positive competitive shock determines a higher sector-level 
PCM, implying that, under particular circumstances, the PCM measure is not monotonic in competition. The RPD 
measure instead increases (decreases) not only for the enhanced (lower) competition that arises from lower entry 
barriers, but also for competition that reallocates output to another bank, thus ensuring the respect of monotonicity 
with respect to the direction of the competitive shock.  
3. Theoretical perspectives 
The competitiveness index (Augmented Relative Profit Difference) was devised by Boone (2008) and is robust as 
compared to traditional measures of competition. Several studies concluded that countries with fewer entry and 
activity restrictions tend to have stronger competition. In contrast, structural variables do not have a significant impact 
on competition, as measured by the H-statistic. Contestability appears to be more important than market structure in 
explaining the strength of competition in the banking sector. Another strand of studies, however, finds that bank size 
matters for market power, and in the way predicted by the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm. 
Competition is found to decrease significantly with bank size. This may be because large banks are in a better position 
to collude with other banks, or because large banks are more likely to operate in less competitive markets.  
Boone (2008) proposes a new competition measure, termed Relative Profit Difference (RPD), which is defined as 
follows. Let π(n) denote the variable profit level of a bank with efficiency level n ϵ R+ where higher n denotes higher 
efficiency. Consider three banks with different efficiency levels, ݊" > ݊′ > ݊, and calculate the RPD as follows: 
 
ܴܲܦ(݊ᇱ, ܰ, ܫ, ߠ) =
ߨ(݊",ܰ, ܫ, ߠ) − ߨ(݊,ܰ, ܫ, ߠ)
ߨ(݊ᇱ, ܰ, ܫ, ߠ) − ߨ(݊, ܰ, ܫ, ߠ)
.																																																																																															(1) 
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The more intense the competition (e.g., lower entry cost or more aggressive interaction among banks), the higher the 
RPD. More precisely, a rise in competition reallocates output from less efficient banks to other banks. Since this 
output reallocation effect is a general feature of more intense competition, which is true for the RPD, it follows that 
RPD is a robust measure of competition from a theoretical point of view.When RPD is used as a measure of 
competition, three assumptions are always made, as postulated by Boone (2008): (1) Efficiency is one dimensional 
(i.e., banks under consideration act in a market with relatively homogeneous goods). If efficiency is, say, two 
dimensional, an increase in competition forces a bank to focus on the activity in which it is most productive. This may 
raise the bank-level price cost margin. If a bank’s efficiency level is not observed, an increase in efficiency leads to a 
higher price-cost margin, which is then (incorrectly), interpreted as reduced competition. (2) A bank’s efficiency level 
can be observed (i.e., we assume symmetry). Hence, banks act on a level playing field that ensures that changes in 
competition affect banks directly and not indirectly through changes in the playing field. It also implies that bank i’s 
profits are the same as bank j’s profits would be if bank j was in bank i’s situation. Thus, within the theoretical 
framework of the indicator, this implies an equal profit level for two equally-efficient companies. (3) Banks compete 
on a level playing field (i.e., we are able to rank banks with respect to their efficiency (n)). If banks compete on an 
uneven playing field, changes in competition can affect the status of the playing field, making it hard to interpret both 
RPD and PCM. Given a competitive shock in the banking sector due to more aggressive behaviour by other banks 
(e.g., a lower elasticity of substitution among products) with consequent lower prices, less efficient banks would exit 
and their market share distributed among other banks, eventually increasing the aggregate PCM. A positive 
competitive shock determines a higher sector-level PCM, implying that, under certain circumstances, the PCM 
measure is not monotonic. The RPD measure instead increases (decreases) not only for the enhanced (lower) 
competition that arises due to lower entry barriers, but also reallocated output to other banks, thus ensuring 
monotonicity with respect to the direction of the competitive shock.  
We introduce a general model with ‘i’ banks that can enter and compete in a market. Banks are ranked such that a 
lower i implies higher efficiency: n1 ≥ n2≥…≥ ni. Each bank i chooses a vector of strategic variables, ai ϵ Rk. This 
choice leads to output vector q(ai; a_i; θ)  R
L
+ for bank i, where θ is a parameter that affects the aggressiveness of 
bank conduct in the market. Further, the choices of the strategic variables also lead to a vector of prices p(ai; a_i; θ)  
RL+ for bank i's products. Finally, we specify the costs of production for bank i as ܥ[ݍ(ܽ݅; 	ܽ௜ ; 	ߠ), ݊݅].	 We say that ni  
R+ measures a bank’s efficiency level. 
The equilibrium variable profits are defined as follows: 
 
ߨ(݊݅, ܰ, ܫ, ߠ) = 	݌(݊݅, ܰ, ܫ, ߠ)் 	ݍ(݊݅,ܰ, ܫ, ߠ)–ܥ[ݍ(݊݅, ܰ, ܫ, ߠ), ݊݅]																																																																									(2) 
 
The efficiency index N needs to be one dimensional to ensure transitivity. Given that the production costs are captured 
by C(q,n) as output quantity, the relationship between efficiency and cost is assumed to be: 
 
߲ܥ(ݍ, ݊)
߲ݍ݈
> 0																																																																																																																																																																																	 
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߲ܥ(ݍ, ݊)
߲݊
≤ 0																																																																																																																																																																																				 
 
߲(
߲ܥ(ݍ, ݊)
߲ݍ݈ )
߲݊
≤ 0																																																																																																																																																																					(3) 
 
for݈	∈ {1,2,…,L}.                                                                
The proposition of the first two quotients on the left-hand side is clear-cut. The first states that banks have positive 
marginal costs. The second quotient states that costs are lower the more efficient banks are. Finally, the quotient at the 
right-hand side states that marginal costs are lower for more efficient banks. Given these assumptions, banks play a 
two-stage game. In the first stage, they decide whether or not to enter a market. This is determined by the entry costs 
and the expected profit. Banks only enter if they are able to recoup entry costs. In the second stage, the remaining 
banks simultaneously choose their actions to maximize profits. This gives a sub-game equilibrium for each 
competitive state. 
Boone (2008) uses two parameters to model changes in competition. One is the conduct parameter θ, which mirrors 
the aggressiveness of banks. The second is the change in entry costs, ε. Then, the output reallocation effect works in 
the following way:  
 
݈݀݊ݍ(݊)	
݀ߠ
																																																																																																																																																																													 
and 
݈݀݊ݍ(݊)
݀(ߝ)
																																																																																																																																																																												(4) 
 
are increasing in n. 
 
Given these conditions, while an increase in competition can decrease the output of banks, this decrease will be 
smaller for more efficient banks. As a result, the market share for the more efficient banks increases while that for the 
less efficient banks shrinks. Hence, competition rewards efficient banks. Given these settings, RPD is calculated as a 
quotient of profit-level differences: 
 
ܴܲܦ(݊, ܰ, ܫ, ߠ) =
గ(௡",ே,ூ,ఏ)ିగ(௡,ே,ூ,ఏ)
గ(௡ᇲ,ே,ூ,ఏ)ିగ(௡,ே,ூ,ఏ)
																																																																				             
 
Increasing competition raises this measure for any three banks, with ݊" > ݊′ > ݊. As Boone (2008) proves, his 
measure of competition is robust to distortions in response to the reallocation effect. However, if there are more than 
three banks, comparing RPDs over time for each bank is impractical. One convenient way, proposed by Boone (2008), 
is to graph the RPDs. Using a bank’s normalized efficiency for the x-coordinates gives a function that is always 
bounded at one on both axes. An increase in competition leads to lower bank-specific RPDs. To measure a change in 
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competition, one calculates and compares the area under both curves. Since we have normalized values, the area is 
bounded between zero and one, with zero implying perfect competition and one the complete absence of competition. 
The area in our example shrinks and thus correctly indicates fiercer competition.  
 
The bank-level measure of RPD is constructed as follows: 
 
ܴܲܦ௜௧ =
ߨ௧	(݅) − ߨ௧(݅௅)
ߨ௧	(݅௎) − ߨ௧(݅௅)
,																																																																																																																																									(5) 
 
where ߨ௧	 is profit at time t, i is the bank whose RPD is measured, and [iL, iU] is the set of banks in an industry and 
ranked by cost-efficiency, from the less efficient, iL, to the more efficient, iU. The inverse of normalized efficiency is: 
 
ܴܥܧ௜௧ =
ܥ௧	(݅௎) − ܥ௧	(݅௅)
ܥ௧	(݅) − ܥ௧	(݅௅)
.																																																																																																																																						(6) 
 
One advantage of the RPD measure is that one does not need to observe all banks in an industry to calculate it 
properly. Since the result holds for any subset of banks sampled, increasing competition would in any case pull down 
the entire curve. Another interesting feature of the RPD measure is that it is also strongly correlated with the within 
effect of the PCM decomposition previously analyzed (Boone et al., 2007). The latter allows us to further assess the 
robustness of the within effect as a selection indicator.  
4. Data and methodology 
In this study, we use annual bank balance sheet and income statement data for the 1996–2011 period retrieved from 
the ‘Statistical Table Relating to Banks in India’ published by RBI and Prowess Database of CMIE. Our data set 
covers all the major banks in the public, private, and foreign sectors.  
 
4.1. A non-parametric measure of competition:RPD 
 
Using a bank-level panel data set, we estimated RPD measure to evaluate competition in the Indian loan markets. Our 
analysis reveals that the non-parametric RPD approach fails to correctly indicate competition. The non-parametric 
RPD is defined as: 
 
ܴܲܦ௜௧ =
ߨ௧	(݅) − ߨ௧(݅௅)
ߨ௧	(݅௎) − ߨ௧(݅௅)
,																																																											 
 
where πt is profit at time t, i is the bank whose RPD is measured, and [iL, iU] is the set of banks belonging to a given 
industry and ranked by cost-efficiency, from the less efficient, iL, to the more efficient, iU. One convenient way, 
proposed by Boone (2008), is to graph the RPDs using the bank’s normalized efficiency and normalized profits. The 
increase in competition leads to lower bank-specific RPDs. To measure competitive change, calculate and compare the 
area under the curves. Since we have normalized the values, the area is bounded between zero and one, with zero 
implying perfect competition and one the complete absence of competition. In this case, the more competitive a sector, 
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the more the curved line would be pulled to the bottom right. From the graph, the levels of competition within a sector 
can be computed as the area below the RPD curve. The smaller the area below the curve, the higher is the level of 
competition.  
 
 
                                                                              Figure 1: Efficiency and RPD 
 
 
Figure 1 shows that as the slope of the curve decreases, the area under the curve decreases, indicating a corresponding 
increase in competition. Using the same intuition, an alternative parametric approach of ARPD is proposed below. 
 
4.2.  A parametric measure of competition: ARPD 
 
Theoretically, loan market competition increases in two ways. First, competition increases when the services of 
various banks become closer substitutes and entry costs decline. Boone et al. (2004) suggest that the market shares of 
more efficient banks increase both under stronger substitution and lower entry costs. So the following relationship 
between market share and marginal cost is (Leuvensteijn, 2007): 
 
ln(ݏ௜) = ߙ + ߚ ln(݉ܿ௜),																																																																																																																																				(7) 
 
where the loan market share of bank i, (si) = (loan)i/total loan, and parameter β is the RPD measure of competition. 
Parameter β is expected to be negative because of the inverse relationship between the market shares of loans of banks 
and the marginal costs of banks. When competition is stronger, its effect will be too; marginal costs will also be 
higher, in absolute terms, since marginal costs are unobservable. We calculate marginal costs using the Translog Cost 
Function (TCF) with linear homogeneity in the input prices and cost exhaustion restrictions using individual bank 
observations. In this type of function, we assume that the technology of a bank can be described by one multiproduct 
production function. Under proper conditions, a dual cost function can be derived from such a production function, 
using augmented output levels and factor prices. A TCF is a second-order Taylor expansion around the mean of a 
generic dual cost function with all variables appearing as logarithms. It is a flexible functional form that has proven to 
be an effective tool in explaining multiproduct bank services. The TCF has the following form: 
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ln(ܿ௜௧) = ߙ଴ +෍ߙௗ௜ +෍ݐߜ௧݀௧ +෍෍ߚ௝ ln൫ݔ௜௝௧൯݀௜ +෍෍෍ߛ௝௞ ln൫ݔ௜௝௧൯ ln(ݔ௜௞௧)݀௜ + ߥ௜௧ 				(8)	 
 
where the dependent variable cit reflects the production costs of bank i(I = 1, .., N ) in year t (t =1, .., T) employing the 
di dummy for the type category of the bank, that is, public, private, or foreign. The dt dummy is a variable, which is 1 
in year t, and zero otherwise. The coefficient γjk indicates general substitution parameters between inputs and outputs. 
The explanatory variables xikt represent three groups of variables (k = 1,...,K). The first group consists of (K1) bank 
output components, such as loans, securities, and other services (proxied by other income). The second group consists 
of (K2) input prices, such as wage rates, deposit rates (as price of funding), and the price of other expenses (proxied as 
the ratio of other expenses to fixed assets). The third group consists of (K - K1 - K2) control variables (also called 
‘netputs’) (e.g., the capital equity ratio). In line with Berger and Mester (1997), the equity ratio corrects for differences 
in loan portfolio risk across banks. The coefficients α and βj vary with the type of bank. The parameters δt are the 
coefficients of the time dummies and υit is the error term. 
The marginal costs of output category j = l (of loans) for bank i of category h (say) in year t, mcilt, are defined 
as: 
 
݉ܿ௜௟௧ =
߲ܿ௜௧	
߲ݔ௜௟௧
= (ܿ௜௧	/ݔ௜௟௧)
߲ln	(ܿ௜௧	)
߲ ln(ݔ௜௟௧)
.																																																																																																												(9) 
 
The term ∂ln(cit)/∂ln(xilt) is the first derivative of equation (8) of costs to loans. This leads to the following equation of 
the marginal costs for the output category loans (l) for bank i in category h during year t: 
 
݉ܿ௜௟௧ = (ܿ௜௧	/ݔ௜௟௧)(ߚ௟ + 2ߛ௟ ln(ݔ௜௟௧) + ∑ߛ௟௞	 ln(ݔ௜௞௧) ݀௜.																																																																				(10)	  
 
Given the estimated marginal costs from the previous section, we are now able to estimate the RPD. We use for each 
bank category the marginal costs of individual banks and their market shares and estimate the following: 
 
ln(ݏ௜௧) = ߙ +෍ߚ௧ ln(݉ܿ௜௧) +෍ߛ௧݀௧ + ݑ௜௧ ,																																																																																				(11)	 
 
where s is market share, mc is marginal costs, i is bank i, t is year t, dt are time dummies, and uit is the error term. This 
provides us with the coefficient	ߚ, the RPD. Under this static model, it is assumed that markets are always in their 
long-run equilibrium at each time period for which the data are observed, yielding statistics that are biased towards 
zero.  
5. Empirical evidence 
Reforms were instituted to induce greater efficiency in the Indian banking system. Has this purpose been achieved? 
There are two ways in which this question can be addressed. One is to examine accounting measures of efficiency, 
while another is to evaluate economic measures of efficiency. One strand of the literature on efficiency in Indian 
banking reports whether or not the public sector banks, which were inefficient at the commencement of reforms, have 
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improved their performance; if this has happened, it augurs well for higher efficiency in the system as a whole. We 
begin our examination by looking at trends in accounting measures of efficiency.  
 
5.1  Competition   
 
One measure of competition in the banking sector is the share of the top five banks in assets, deposits, and profits. It 
can be seen in Table 1 that on all three indicators, the share of the top five banks has declined, which points to 
increased competition in the marketplace. 
 
Table 1: Share of top five banks 
 
Period Assets Deposits Profits 
1991-1992 51.70 49.00 54.50 
1998-1999 44.70 44.40 49.10 
2001-2002 43.50 43.30 41.40 
2007-2008 38.40 37.30 37.20 
2010-2011 40.79 36.44 36.41 
 
5.2 Interest Spread  
 
One measure of interest spread is the ratio of net interest margin (NIM) to total assets. One would expect the spread to 
decline subsequent to deregulation. Deregulation measures are designed to squeeze the margins of producers and leads 
to an increase in volume. India’s banking sector has been relatively impervious to this trend. Table 2 shows the trend 
in NIM in the period since deregulation. The NIM was surprisingly steady from the start of deregulation until 2006-
2007. For three years thereafter, there was hint of a decline in NIM. In 2010-2011, however, the NIM rose again and 
was slightly above the level at the start of deregulation. This has, of course, been advantageous for banks, although it 
is counterintuitive to the rationale for deregulation. 
 
Table 2: Net Interest Income (Spread) to Total Assets (Average) 
 
Period Public Sector Banks Old Private Sector Banks New Private Sector Banks Foreign Banks  Scheduled Commercial Banks 
1992-1995 2.72 3.24 1.17 3.98 2.84 
1999-2000 2.70 2.33 1.95 3.92 2.73 
2000-2001 2.86 2.51 2.14 3.63 2.85 
2003-2004 2.94 2.60 1.98 3.46 2.86 
2004-2005 2.92 2.70 2.17 3.33 2.83 
2007-2008 2.15 2.43 2.40 3.79 2.35 
2008-2009 2.10 2.60 2.80 3.90 2.40 
2009-2010 2.29 2.56 3.00 3.96 2.17 
2010-2011 2.78 2.95 3.16 3.86 2.92 
 
Efficiency, as measured by net profit to total assets, has shown an unambiguous improvement over the years and has 
reached 1% in recent years. (Internationally, a 1% return on assets is considered a benchmark for good performance.) 
It is striking that, in the years following the subprime crisis, the return on assets has remained over 1% in the Indian 
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banking sector. This is a measure of how insulated the Indian banking sector is; it is also reflective of the steady 
improvement in fundamentals in the sector. 
 
Table 3: Net Profit/Total Assets (%) 
 
Period Public Sector Bank Old Private Sector Bank New Private Sector Bank Foreign Banks  Scheduled Commercial Bank 
1996-1997 0.57 0.91 1.73 1.19 0.67 
1997-1998 0.77 0.80 1.55 0.96 0.82 
1998-1999 0.42 0.48 1.03 0.69 0.47 
1999-2000 0.57 0.81 0.97 1.17 0.66 
2000-2001 0.42 0.59 0.81 0.93 0.49 
2002-2003 0.96 1.17 0.90 1.56 1.01 
2004-2005 0.87 0.33 1.05 1.29 0.89 
2006-2007 0.83 0.70 0.91 1.57 0.90 
2008-2009 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.70 1.00 
2009-2010 0.97 0.95 1.38 1.26 1.05 
2010-2011 0.96 1.12 1.51 1.74 1.10 
 
5.3 Operating costs  
 
The ratio of operating costs to total assets has declined dramatically in the post-reform era, driven largely by the 
decline in the ratio for the public sector banks. The most important reason is that the workforce has remained fairly 
constant at these banks through the initial reform years, largely due to the rising volume of work. It is only in the past 
three years or so that the workforce has begun to increase. Another reason is branch rationalization. The hard work of 
establishing branches was accomplished in the nationalization era, so public sector banks found that they did not have 
to invest in branches and could, in fact, close a few. Thus, banking system efficiency in the post-reform era can be said 
to have improved, using a set of accounting measures. 
 
Table 4: Intermediation Costs to Total Assets Ratio (percent) 
 
Period Public Sector Bank Old Private Sector Bank New Private Sector Bank Foreign Banks  Scheduled Commercial Bank 
1996-1997 2.88 2.52 1.94 3.00 2.85 
1997-1998 2.66 2.31 1.76 2.97 2.63 
1998-1999 2.66 2.26 1.74 3.59 2.67 
2004-2005 2.09 1.96 2.06 2.88 2.13 
2006-2007 1.77 1.85 2.11 2.78 1.91 
2007-2008 1.54 1.66 2.28 2.84 1.78 
2008-2009 1.50 1.70 2.20 2.80 1.70 
2009-2010 1.61 1.88 2.16 2.52 1.78 
2010-2011 1.70 1.94 2.23 2.71 1.86 
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5.4 Non-parametric RPD estimation 
The non-parametric RPD is defined as follows: 
 
ܴܲܦ௜௧ =
గ೟	(௜)ିగ೟(௜ಽ)
గ೟	(௜ೆ)ିగ೟(௜ಽ)
, 
 
where πt is profit at time t, i is the bank whose RPD is measured, and [iL, iU] is the set of banks belonging to a given 
industry and ranked by cost efficiency, from the less efficient banks, iL, to the more efficient banks, iU. One convenient 
way, proposed by Boone (2008), is to graph the RPDs using a bank’s normalized efficiency and normalized profits. 
An increase in competition leads to lower bank-specific RPDs. To measure the change in competition, calculate and 
compare the area under a curve. Since we have normalized values, the area is bounded between zero and one, with 
zero implying perfect competition and one the complete absence of competition. In this case, the more competitive a 
sector, the more the curved line would be pulled to the bottom right. The levels of competition within a sector can be 
computed as the area below the RPD curve. The smaller the area below the curve, the higher the level of competition 
within a sector. The non-parametric values of RPD were calculated from the dataset and are compared with two other 
commonly-used measures of competition in Table 5.  
 
Table 5: Different Measures of Competition 
 
Year RPD (Non-parametric) H-stat PCM 
1996 0.357 0.666 0.514 
1997 0.315 0.734 0.553 
1998 0.347 0.646 0.504 
1999 0.399 0.627 0.463 
2000 0.479 0.633 0.427 
2001 0.392 0.615 0.427 
2002 0.185 0.440 0.344 
2003 0.434 0.466 0.423 
2004 0.513 0.646 0.454 
2005 0.468 0.656 0.467 
2006 0.429 0.458 0.462 
2007 0.521 0.616 0.448 
2008 0.620 0.584 0.397 
2009 0.668 0.492 0.332 
2010 0.691 0.503 0.381 
2011 0.632 0.514 0.402 
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The results for the traditional Lerner Index (PCM) in Table 5 indicate a general decrease in bank competition up to 
around 2002; an increase in bank competition begins in 2003. Moreover, the traditional Lerner Index indicates a non-
consistent trend of an increase in competition for most years. Furthermore, the H-statistics are significantly different 
from zero and one for all years, rejecting the null hypothesis that the loan markets in India are in a state of either 
perfect competition or monopoly. The H-statistic measure performed better than the PCM measure but is not 
consistent when compared with the RPD measure. 
 
5.5 Parametric ARPD estimation 
It is evident from Table 5 that the RPD value over the sample period is highly volatile. This volatility may be assumed 
to be due to the non-parametric measurement technique, which employs normalized efficiency and normalized 
profitability. The RPD measure gives a better idea of the state and process of competitiveness in the loan market as 
compared to conventional H-statistics and the PCM measure. We used the ARPD measure suggested by Leuvensteijn 
(2008) to measure competition. We estimated marginal costs using Translog Cost Function. As shown in Table 6, 
competition measured using the ARPD measure is statistically significant in a consistent manner for all the banks. As 
it is known from the theory proposed by Boone (2008), in an absolute sense, higher coefficients indicate higher 
competition. We conclude that competitiveness in both private sector banks and public sector banks has decreased as 
compared to foreign banks during the sample period. Competition in the banking sector increased after 2002, except 
for a marginal decrease during 2006-2007. All the coefficients are between 0 and 1, which indicates the monopolistic 
nature of competitiveness in the loan market in India. The ARPD measure quantifies the impact of marginal costs on 
performance, measured in terms of market share. Here the original RPD is improved by calculating marginal costs 
instead of approximating marginal costs using average variable costs. After the recent financial crisis, foreign banks 
have been adversely affected in terms of competition as compared to both the public sector and private sector banks. 
Competition levels for the foreign banks fluctuate due to their risk-taking behavior and global risk exposure. Overall, 
according to the ARPD measure, competitive conditions in the loan markets have increased over the study period. The 
loan markets in India are found to be monopolistic in nature.  
 
Table 6: The ARPD Measure of Competition 
 
ARPD Measure ALL PSB PVT FRN 
1996 -0.315(0.086)** -0.304(0.084)** -0.228(0.057)** -0.338(0.308) 
1997 -0.340(0.087)** -0.329(0.085)** -0.242(0.058)** -0.357(0.300) 
1998 -0.356(0.085)** -0.345(0.086)** -0.227(0.056)** -0.672(0.341)* 
1999 -0.307(0.086)** -0.296(0.081)** -0.189(0.057)** -0.547(0.359) 
2000 -0.384(0.091)** -0.374(0.091)** -0.235(0.061)** -0.414(0.348)** 
2001 -0.359(0.088)** -0.346(0.087)** -0.223(0.058)** -0.420(0.395)* 
2002 -0.453(0.091)** -0.442(0.091)** -0.299(0.059)** -0.392(0.432)** 
2003 -0.404(0.086)** -0.395(0.086)** -0.363(0.057)** -0.470(0.343)** 
2004 -0.384(0.080)** -0.376(0.079)** -0.357(0.054)** -0.504(0.261)** 
2005 -0.390(0.067)** -0.432(0.067)** -0.409(0.046)** -0.320(0.201)** 
2006 -0.341(0.061)** -0.433(0.060)** -0.431(0.041)** -0.499(0.187)** 
2007 -0.360(0.051)** -0.543(0.051)** -0.423(0.034)** -0.475(0.174)** 
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2008 -0.388(0.061)** -0.513(0.051)** -0.421(0.042)** -0.563(0.180)** 
2009 -0.452(0.050)** -0.603(0.051)** -0.531(0.033)** -0.644(0.193)** 
2010 -0.448(0.059)** -0.572(0.062)** -0.543(0.032)** -0.663(0.178)** 
2011 -0.493(0.063)** -0.656(0.059)** -0.625(0.034)** -0.694(0.184) ** 
 
On average, competition in the loan markets has increased. It is evident from Table 6 that both public sector and 
private sector banks have higher ARPD levels, although private sector levels have increased at a more rapid pace. The 
foreign sector banks were comparatively less competitive up to 1999, but increased continuously until 2005. The 
ARPD of the foreign banks decreased during the onset of the financial crisis, but increased gradually thereafter. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we measured bank competition in the Indian loan markets using a new competitiveness index, the 
Augmented Relative Profit Difference (ARPD) index. This index can be used to quantify the impact of marginal costs 
on performance, measured in terms of market share. The original Boone RPD is enhanced by calculating marginal 
costs instead of approximating marginal costs using average variable costs. The conventional measures of competition, 
such as the Lerner Index and the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic, did not perform as well as those estimated using the 
ARPD approach. We argue that traditional measures of competition fail to adequately measure competition in the 
Indian banking sector. 
Using balance sheet information for a large sample of banks operating in India during 1996–2011, we show that 
competition actually increased in the past decade when using the ARPD measure introduced by Boone et al. (2007) 
and Boone (2008) as a theoretically robust competitiveness index to measure competition in loan markets. This study 
yields two major insights. First, the theoretical foundation of the ARPD is very robust as compared to other 
conventional measures. This makes the ARPD a much better measure to evaluate competition in a single sector of an 
industry, say Indian loan markets, than conventional approaches. This is a general insight that can be useful for 
investigations of competitive conditions in banking markets in a particular sector. Second, applying this unbiased 
competition indicator to India loan markets shows that recent financial reform measures contributed to significant 
improvements in competition. Again, we find contradictory results for the conventional measures.  
We found that public sector banks and private sector banks are comparatively more competitive than foreign banks. 
All in all, according to the ARPD measure, competitive conditions in the loan markets in India over time increased 
and the ARPD values lie between zero and one. This finding indicates that the Indian loan markets are monopolistic in 
nature.  
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